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Abstract 
Eliciting numerical estimates from people is a central challenge for psychology. Cognitive biases can 
affect estimates, making it challenging to measure what people know or believe. We present a novel 
elicitation method, More-Or-Less Elicitation (MOLE) that, rather than having people make a single, 
absolute judgment, asks for repeated, relative judgments across the range of possible estimates and 
constructs a probability density function (PDF) representing their beliefs. Study 1 uses a perceptual 
estimation task to compare these PDFs with traditionally elicited ranges, concluding that MOLE 
improves accuracy and precision. Study 2 shows that, compared to alternate, repeated-judgment 
methods, MOLE takes less time and does not require distractors. Study 3 shows MOLE’s efficacy in 
eliciting answers to general knowledge questions. We argue that MOLE benefits from using relative 
rather than absolute questions, avoids problems usually associated with repeated questions, and is a 
useful method for theoretical and applied researchers needing to elicit uncertain information. 
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More-Or-Less Elicitation (MOLE): Incorporating Repeated Judgments from Individuals 
Many technical disciplines share - with psychology - the problem of eliciting information 
from people. The problem is one of translating peoples’ beliefs into useable data (Wolfson, 2001). Of 
particular interest is how to best achieve this under uncertainty, where there is no single, correct 
answer but rather the “correct” response for an individual varies according to their degree of 
knowledge about the topic (Morgan & Henrion, 1990).  
The reason for interest in this area is elicitation’s ubiquity. In all fields where certain 
knowledge is unavailable, we use expert judgments, estimates and forecasts to fill in the range of 
possible outcomes. Thus, we rely on elicited opinion in such diverse areas as medical diagnoses, 
weather forecasting, financial forecasting, risk analysis and judicial decisions. A key goal of 
psychology, therefore, should be the understanding and improvement of elicitation methods such that 
experts’ estimates and forecasts can be improved. Despite this, argument continues about the best 
ways to elicit information, and people are still observed to be subject to biases, so that elicited 
responses are less accurate than elicitors wish (see, e.g., Hawkins, Coopersmith, & Cunningham, 
2002; Lichtenstein, Fischhoff, & Phillips, 1982; Welsh, Begg, & Bratvold, 2007a).  
This paper discusses elicitation and some of its problems and then proposes an elicitation 
method based on simple judgments. Our “More-Or-Less Elicitation” (MOLE) method asks people to 
make repeated, relative judgments rather than single, absolute judgments. We test MOLE against 
alternative elicitation methods under various conditions of uncertainty and on a variety of questions, 
and find that it performs well. 
Elicitation 
The elicitation of uncertainty is the conversion of individual or group beliefs into numerical 
form – such as a point estimate or a probability distribution – in order  to, for example, predict future 
outcomes or provide inputs for forecasting models (Morgan & Keith, 1995).  More-Or-Less Elicitation (MOLE)  4
In order to be of benefit, elicited values need to be accurate. Accuracy, in this case, however, 
refers to two separate ideas. The first sense, which we might call objective accuracy, is the one that 
naturally springs to mind: elicited values need to accurately reflect the probability of an event 
occurring. Equally important, however, is subjective accuracy: how well elicited values map onto a 
person’s beliefs. The problem is that the two senses are not easily separated. Instead we have to rely 
on relatively crude measures like overconfidence or calibration scores (Lichtenstein, et al., 1982), 
that conflate the two. 
Problems for Elicitation 
Standard findings in the elicitation literature are that people’s guesses are anchored by 
previously observed values and that they are overconfident, thereby producing too narrow ranges of 
possible outcomes (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). There is also evidence, however, that this is not 
entirely due to inaccuracies in people’s beliefs. Specifically, different elicitation techniques result in 
different responses. Winman, Hansson and Juslin (2004), for example, demonstrate that evaluating 
rather than producing a range leads to less overconfidence in people’s responses. 
There are also concerns about the effect of question order within an elicitation task, dating 
back to Tversky and Kahneman’s (1974) paper, where they suggested that anchoring on an initial 
best guess might be a cause of overconfidence. Subsequent findings, however, have been mixed 
with, for example, Russo and Schoemaker (1992) finding the predicted effect but Block and Harper 
(1991) and Juslin, Wennerholm and Olsson (1999) finding the opposite. Despite this, in applied 
settings, the simplest elicitation techniques remain those that are most commonly used. For example, 
within the oil and gas industry, the use of 80% confidence intervals constructed by simply asking for 
a low and high value remains the standard despite overwhelming evidence that these contain the true 
value less than 50% of the time  (Capen, 1976; Hawkins, et al., 2002). 
Debiasing Elicitation 
Given these problems, significant work has gone into attempts to debias elicited values. Early 
work (summarized in Morgan & Henrion, 1990) indicated little success in reducing overconfidence More-Or-Less Elicitation (MOLE)  5
and none for anchoring. As noted above, however, there are now techniques known to reduce 
overconfidence, including Winman et al’s (2004) use of interval assessment, and the use of long-
term repeated feedback (Lichtenstein, et al., 1982). Additionally, the use, by expert elicitors of 
counterintuitive examples (lying outside the initial range) has been shown to be effective in reducing 
overconfidence (Hawkins, et al., 2002). This remedy, though, requires an expert elicitor to be on 
hand to ask the right questions and leaves open the question of whether simply drawing people’s 
attention to regions of the possibility space outside their initial range is helpful in the absence of 
expertise. In addition, none of these techniques eliminates overconfidence, except in some very 
specific cases such as weather forecasting, where repeated feedback seems to have resulted in good 
calibration (Murphy & Winkler, 1977). 
 Multiple  versus  Repeated Judgments in Elicitation. Recent work on the “Wisdom of the 
Crowd” has drawn attention to the benefits of multiple or repeated judgments in estimation tasks as 
different as election polling and box office takings projections (Wolfers & Zitzewitz, 2004). That is, 
having either multiple people all estimate the same value and then combining these (see, e.g., 
Surowiecki, 2004) or, less intuitively, having the same person make repeated estimates and 
combining these (Vul & Pashler, 2008). 
The benefit of this approach lies in noise reduction. To the extent that the error in one 
estimate is independent of the error in the others, the average of estimates will tend to be better than 
any, randomly chosen, estimate. Even in the case of a single individual making two estimates 
immediately one after the other, Vul and Pashler (2008) found that the average of these estimates 
was more accurate than either – supporting the conclusion that the error in each estimate is, at least 
partly, independent. 
Similarly, Soll and Klayman (2004) demonstrated that asking a person for two values – one 
that the true value will be above and one it will be below (with some likelihood in each case) 
produced better estimates than asking for a single range that the true value was expected to fall 
within. More recently, Herzog and Hertwig (2009) have shown that individual judgments can be More-Or-Less Elicitation (MOLE)  6
improved via “dialectical bootstrapping”. This is a process inspired by research into consider-the-
opposite debiasing methods (see, e.g., Larrick, 2004) which result in individuals sampling from their 
knowledge in distinct ways. Herzog and Hertwig’s (2009) method produced significant greater gains 
in accuracy on date estimation tasks than simply repeating the task but did not equal the benefit 
gained from including a second person’s estimate.  
Thus, it seems possible that incorporating repeated estimation into elicitation techniques, 
where expert opinions are converted into numerical judgments about the range and probability of 
possible outcomes (Wolfson, 2001) might yield improvements. Specifically, one would hope to see 
improvements in accuracy - both objective (how well they correspond to observations from the real 
world) and subjective (how well confidence judgments accord with the proportion of accurate 
judgments, Lichtenstein, et al., 1982). 
There are, however, obvious problems in using repeated judgments as part of an elicitation 
technique. We often do not have the time or resources to contact multiple experts for opinions, which 
is why a single expert is relied upon. But asking an individual to make repeated estimates of the 
same value can yield dependent estimates because of potential biases such as anchoring and the 
confirmation bias (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). That is, people may be strongly influenced by the 
numbers they have just given or search for reasons that their first estimate is right rather than 
considering alternatives. Vul and Pashler’s (2008) results support this concern, showing that a 
repeated estimate made immediately after the first, while providing some benefit, is of far less 
benefit than one made after a three week period. Similarly, work by Rauhut and Lorenz (in press) 
and by Ariely et al (2000) has demonstrated the limitations of repeated inquiry from a single person. 
To avoid such problems, we need a way of repeatedly asking an individual about the same 
estimation task, while avoiding the problems of repetition and confirmation. Thus, to be of the 
greatest benefit, an individual’s repeated judgments need to be separated by either a significant 
period of time or by distractor tasks to maximize the independence of the judgments – although, of 
course, in terms of utility, any significant time delay will cause difficulties. An ideal task would also More-Or-Less Elicitation (MOLE)  7
probe the elicitee’s knowledge repeatedly in different ways so as to get estimates that are as 
independent as possible and recover more than the two estimates gathered by previous methods. 
The MOLE Method 
The idea of an elicitation method using a series of simple, relative judgments was previously 
explored in Welsh, et al (2004). They found a benefit but relied heavily on assumptions about the 
underlying distribution required to create a probability distribution from the judgments. Our current 
goal is to revise this method so as to create an elicitation method that produces elicited responses 
exhibiting less overconfidence than methods requiring direct estimation of values. 
Given the problems with elicitation and the observation that question format has a large 
impact on the elicited responses, it is worth considering more radical departures from the standard 
elicitation methods. For example, the work of Gigerenzer and others (Gigerenzer & Selten, 2001; 
Gigerenzer & Todd, 1999) on bounded rationality has yielded insights into the sorts of questions that 
the human mind seems most comfortable working with.  
One core observation is that people are better at making relative judgments than absolute 
ones (Stewart, Brown, & Chater, 2005). Combining this insight with the observation that counter-
intuitive examples can reduce overconfidence (Hawkins, et al., 2002), and the observations above 
regarding the benefits of repeated judgments, leads to the idea that better estimates may result from 
asking a series of questions - covering the range of possibilities - rather than allowing a person to 
hone in on a small region of outcomes and exclude other values. This idea has clear parallels in 
psychophysics; in particular, with the two-alternative forced-choice (2AFC) tasks used almost 
ubiquitously therein (for a recent discussion, see, Bogasz, Brown, Moehlis, Holmes, & Cohen, 
2006). These tasks require a person to select one of two options in response to a perceptual stimulus 
and are generally used to find the limits of perceptual discrimination – by determining the smallest 
difference (in luminosity, pitch, etc) that a person can identify (Miller, 1956). More-Or-Less Elicitation (MOLE)  8
For the purposes of elicitation, a range rather than a point estimate is the goal but it still 
seems possible to use this 2AFC paradigm in the elicitation process. The central problem is how to 
ask questions in a manner that avoids repetition of answers. In psychophysics, this is made easier by 
people’s poor ability to make absolute judgments and the use of stimuli that can be repeated in a 
‘blind’ manner. Stroop (1932), for example, demonstrated that averaging one individual’s rankings 
of various weights was just as effective as averaging a groups – so long as the testing was done over 
several days so that the individual could not identify the weights. 
To summarize, we see the potential for an elicitation technique with three benefits over 
traditional range estimation methods: 
1.  Use of simple, relative rather than absolute judgments. 
2.  Use of repeated judgments in a manner that avoids problems with repetition. 
3.  Use of questions that force exploration across the range of possibility. 
Experiment 1 
The first experiment compared estimates elicited using MOLE with those achieved using 
traditional range estimation methods. Three elicitation methods were chosen for comparison with 
MOLE: a simple range estimation task, with participants giving a minimum and maximum estimate; 
a triangular estimation task, which tested the impact of including a best guess prior to estimating the 
range; and an iterative elicitation task, to assess the impact of calling participants’ attention to 
regions outside their initially estimated range. The rationale for choosing these three methods was 
that the simple method, while known to produce overconfidence, most accurately reflects current 
practice in applied settings, whereas the other methods were selected based on evidence that they 
might provide some reduction in overconfidence by requiring a best guess as well as a range (Block 
& Harper, 1991) or by deliberately questioning ranges (Hawkins, et al., 2002). More-Or-Less Elicitation (MOLE)  9
Method 
Participants 
Participants were 40 undergraduate students (12 male and 28 female) from the University of 
Adelaide with a mean age of 20.1 (SD = 1.9). All received a $10 book voucher for their participation. 
Materials 
Four graphical user interfaces (GUIs) were developed - one for each elicitation method. All 
GUIs displayed an array of 100 to 300 circles (determined randomly at each trial) and elicited the 
participant’s beliefs regarding the number of circles, in accordance with the varying elicitation 
techniques. The use of perceptual stimuli, rather than more traditional almanac-style questions (see, 
e.g., Capen, 1976), was prompted by a desire to create a task on which people could be assumed to 
be approximately equally skilled, eliminating differences in general knowledge and, in addition, 
enabling the use of stimuli that could be repeated without recognition by participants (required in 
Experiment 2).  
For each elicitation technique the same, basic GUI layout was used, with only the questions 
being asked and the buttons used to respond differing. As an example, Figure 1 shows the layout 
used for the More-Or-Less Elicitation (MOLE) condition, asking participants to select which of two 
values is closer to their estimate. The GUI controls were sequentially locked and unlocked to ensure 
that participants answered each question before continuing to the next, thereby ensuring participants 
completed the questions in the prescribed order. 
Procedure 
Participants were randomly sorted into four groups, to allow counterbalancing via a Latin 
square design, prior to completing 10 trials on each of the four elicitation methods, described below. 
Testing took approximately one hour.  
Simple Elicitation. Participants were asked to provide a minimum and maximum value for the 
number of circles. Following this, they indicated their confidence that their range contained the true More-Or-Less Elicitation (MOLE)  10
value. This was done using a slider similar to the one seen in Figure 1 but capable of taking any 
integer value from 0 to 100%.
1 
Triangular Elicitation. Participants were asked to provide a best guess prior to giving their 
minimum and maximum values, thus providing sufficient information to produce a triangular 
distribution. Again, after setting their range, they were asked to indicate their confidence on a 0-
100% scale. 
Iterative Elicitation. Participants were asked to provide an initial range as in the Simple 
Elicitation condition but then shown values for the minimum and maximum that lay outside their 
own range. These were described as having been elicited from “previous participants” but were 
actually calculated by the program to lie outside the initial range (60% of the initial minimum and 
140% of the initial maximum). Participants were then given the opportunity to reduce their 
overconfidence by increasing their range width in response to this additional information. Once 
satisfied with their estimates, participants were asked to indicate their confidence that the true value 
would fall inside their range on a 0 to 100% range.  
More-Or-Less Elicitation. Participant’s data from the MOLE task consisted of their responses 
to ten sets of questions. At the first stage of the task, participants were shown a pair of numbers and 
asked to select whichever of these they believed closer to the true value - that is, closer to what they 
believe the true value was. Having selected one of these numbers, they were then asked to indicate 
how confident they were in this choice from 50% (guessing) to 100% (certain than the selected 
option is closer to the true value).  
At the end of each stage, the range from which options were being drawn was reconsidered in 
light of the participant’s response. Specifically, if they had made a selection with 100% confidence, 
then this logically entails that they believed the true value must lie closer to their selection than the 
alternative. Therefore, all values lying closer to the alterative were eliminated from the range from 
which future alternatives were drawn. More-Or-Less Elicitation (MOLE)  11
For example, in Experiments 1 and 2, the initial preset range was 0-400. If, as is the case in 
stage one of the data presented in Table 1, below, the participant was shown the values of 2 and 22 
and chose 22 with 100% confidence, then all values lying closer to 2 than 22 were eliminated. That 
is, all values below 12 were eliminated from future consideration – leaving a range of 12-314 for 
future options to be drawn randomly from at stage 2. 
By comparison, if the person was not 100% confident in their selection then no part of the 
range was eliminated as this was taken to indicate that the participant believed it possible, however 
unlikely, that the true value lay closer to the option they did not select. Instead, these non-100% 
confidence ratings were taken into account after the completion of the task, during the construction 
of the PDF representing the participant’s beliefs over the range of possible numbers. 
  Specifically, for each stage of the trial when the participant was not 100% confident in their 
choice, a triangular PDF was created, with the minimum and maximum fixed at the endpoints of the 
final range – after eliminating any values the participant did not believe to be possible (as described 
above) and a height of 2/(max-min) to make its total area equal 1. The mode of the triangular 
distribution was set according to the confidence the participant had in the particular judgment they 
made at that stage of the task. 
For example, in stage 3 of the data shown in Table 1 and subplot a) of Figure 2, the 
participant was shown the options 243 and 398 and selected 398, with 86% confidence. The mode of 
the triangular PDF is, therefore, set 86% of the way between 243 and 398. That is, at 376. Such a 
PDF is calculated for each non-absolute confidence judgment made by the participant (as seen in 
subplot b) of Figure 2) and these are then averaged in subplot c) of Figure 2 to yield the overall PDF 
representing the participant’s beliefs about the relative likelihoods of differing numbers.  
For the purposes of our analyses, the mode from this PDF was used as representative of the 
participant’s best guess, while their final ‘feasible’ range was used to calculate their degree of 
calibration (i.e., how often their range contained the true value). 
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Note on analyses. 
Throughout our analyses, we are dealing with variables that violate the assumptions of 
standard parametric tests. Therefore, wherever possible, we report the 20% trimmed mean as this is 
more robust to the effects of outliers and skewness (Keselman, Algina, Lix, Wilcox, & Deering, 
2008). Additionally, we calculate our confidence intervals around the means via bootstrapping, using 
the method described in Erceg-Hurn and Mirosevich (2008) and 10,000 bootstrapped samples.   
Comparisons between conditions are made using the trimmed means and corresponding confidence 
intervals unless specifically stated otherwise. Additionally, given growing concerns regarding the use 
of null hypothesis significance testing (see, e.g, Wagenmakers, 2007), while our confidence intervals 
follow the standard conventions – yielding alpha levels of .05 – we discuss our results without 
reference to the significance of results, instead focusing on inferences from the confidence intervals 
as suggested by Cumming and Finch (2005). 
Where effect sizes are given, these are also robust measures; specifically, we use the non-
parametric, probability-based measure, A,  described by Ruscio (2008). Values of A of 0.56 are 
regarded as small effects, 0.64 medium and 0.71 large. This value simply shows the probability that a 
randomly chosen individual’s results from one condition are better than a randomly chosen result 
from an alternative condition. Thus, for an effect to be large, there needs to be a 71% chance that a 
randomly selected score from the first condition will be better than a randomly selected score from 
the second condition. 
Overconfidence. 
Whereas overconfidence is generally used as the primary measure of the efficacy of an 
elicitation method, this can be further divided into the accuracy and the precision of the elicited 
responses. To test whether the MOLE's repeated, relative judgments would result in superior 
estimates than traditional elicitation, we examine overall overconfidence as measured by the  number 
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terms of the correlation between participants’ estimates and the true values and in terms of their 
absolute errors. 
Overall Overconfidence 
Overconfidence, in terms of elicited ranges, is measured from the degree of ‘coverage’ 
achieved (i.e, how often the range contained the true value) and participants’ stated levels of 
confidence. That is, for each participant, we have a single ‘calibration’ score, which reflects the 
percentage of their ranges (calculated from their 10 ranges in each condition) containing the true 
value and their average stated confidence across those ranges. Their ‘overconfidence’ score is simply 
the difference between the participants’ mean stated confidence and calibration. The only exception 
to this is in the MOLE condition, in which the participants did not state their confidence. Rather, as 
the final range was calculated from participants’ judgments, it was assumed that their confidence in 
this final range was 100%. Figure 3 shows these data for each of the four conditions. 
It is clear from Figure 3 that all three techniques requiring participants to estimate absolute 
ranges (Simple, Triangular and Iterative) resulted in high levels of overconfidence ranging from 43.6 
to 50.8% (despite the fact that participants’ confidence in their ranges hovered around 70-75%). By 
comparison, the MOLE, with its assumed 100% confidence level, resulted in only 7.1% 
overconfidence. Clearly, there is a large effect of condition here, with comparisons between the 
MOLE and the other methods yielding A values of 0.86, 0.85 and 0.83 when compared to the Simple, 
Triangular and Iterative, respectively. 
The confidence intervals in Figure 3, however, are not appropriate for assessing differences 
between the conditions as the experimental design is within subjects. Therefore, we need to make our 
assessments based on the mean differences between the possible conditions. These data are shown in 
the top subplot of Figure 4. 
Looking at the confidence intervals in the Overconfidence subplot of Figure 4, one sees the 
mean differences between each unique pair of conditions. The three left-most are the comparison 
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sizes described above, none of the confidence intervals around these mean differences contains zero 
and, therefore, we can plausibly conclude that there is a benefit of the MOLE over the other 
conditions in terms of overconfidence. 
Accuracy. To assess the objective accuracy of participants’ responses under each elicitation 
condition, measures of central tendency from each elicited range were compared with the true value. 
For the Simple and Iterative elicitation conditions, a uniform distribution was assumed
2 and thus the 
mean (midpoint) was used. For the Triangular, the value used was the “most likely” value given by 
the participant. Finally, for the MOLE, the mode was taken from the participant’s subjective PDF. 
These values were used to calculate correlations between each participant’s estimates and the true 
values they had seen and also their mean absolute percentage error (i.e., average percentage 
difference between their estimates and the true values). 
 Figure 5 shows the distribution of correlations between individual participants’ estimates and 
the true values that they saw and suggests that only in the MOLE condition did participant estimates 
accurately track the number of objects in the stimuli. The mean correlation for the MOLE condition 
is 0.63, compared to -0.11, 0.08 and -0.04 for the Simple, Triangular and Iterative, respectively and, 
as was the case for overconfidence above, the effect of condition is large, A = 0.92 0.90 and 0.88. 
Returning to Figure 4, one can see, in the subplot labeled Correlations, that, again, none of 
the  confidence intervals around the mean differences comparing the MOLE to the other conditions 
contain zero and, thus, we can plausibly conclude that the MOLE has an advantage in terms of 
accuracy (as measured by the correlations between participants’ estimates and the true values). 
Figure 6 shows the distribution of participants’ mean absolute percentage errors. Once again, 
the MOLE produces the best results, with its mean error being only 17.8%, compared to 23.8, 21.9 
and 27.1% for the Simple, Triangular and Iterative, respectively but the use of the trimmed mean has 
lessened its benefit – as can be seen by comparing the trimmed and untrimmed means in Figure 6. 
The effect size for condition is only medium here, A = 0.62 0.63 0.64, comparing the MOLE to the 
Simple, Triangular and Iterative, respectively. More-Or-Less Elicitation (MOLE)  15
Returning to Figure 4, we can see, in the ‘Abs. Percent Error’ subplot, that the mean 
differences between the MOLE and other conditions are not as clearly different from zero here as 
they were on the other measures. Only in the comparison between the MOLE and Iterative 
conditions does the confidence interval not include zero. However, the general pattern of results 
would still seem to support the conclusion that the MOLE provides a benefit to the accuracy of 
participant’s estimates. 
Other Findings 
Best Guesses and Overconfidence. A secondary research goal was to determine whether 
requiring participants to give a best guess prior to fixing their confidence interval’s end-points would 
affect its width and thus their levels of overconfidence, since previous research on this question has 
been mixed (see, e.g., Block & Harper, 1991; Heywood-Smith, Welsh, & Begg, 2008; Russo & 
Schoemaker, 1992; Welsh, et al., 2004). 
The data in Figure 3 reveal little difference between participants’ responses in the Simple and 
Triangular conditions with the average overconfidence being almost identical (49.7 versus 50.8%) 
and the effect size being very small at A = 0.51. Similarly, an examination of the Simple versus 
Triangular comparison in Figure 4’s Overconfidence subplot shows the confidence interval includes 
zero.  
That accuracy data in Figures  5 and 6, by comparison, is suggestive of a weak advantage to 
the Triangular over the Simple but with mean correlations of -.11 and .08 it is not clear how much 
weight should be attached to this – although the effect size is medium, A = 0.65. Similarly, the 
participants’ absolute percentage errors were slightly less in the Triangular than in the Simple, 21.9 
versus 23.8%, but the effect size here was very weak, A = 0.51. An examination of the confidence 
intervals in Figure 4’s ‘Correlations’ and ‘Abs. Percentage Error’ subplot supports the conclusion 
that the Triangular condition might offer a slight benefit in terms of correlation strength over the 
Simple method but that this does not come with a corresponding increase in the accuracy of 
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Overall, then, there might be some benefit in terms of accuracy to elicit responses via the 
Triangular method rather than the Simple but this does not result in any net gain in calibration as any 
benefits in accuracy are also resulting in increased confidence. 
Iterative Elicitation. The final research question related to whether participants could be 
prompted to reconsider and widen their ranges by providing them with reasons to reconsider values 
outside their initially estimated range. Figures 3-6, however, offer very little support for this 
hypothesis. In particular, we note that, in Figure 4, the comparisons between the Iterative condition 
and both the Simple and Triangular result in confidence intervals around the mean difference that 
always include zero. That is, it would be implausible to conclude that there is any difference between 
these conditions.  
  Participant Performance. While not something considered in advance, the extremely poor 
performance of the participants in the three conditions requiring absolute estimates requires 
comment. While people are, notoriously, bad at absolute judgments (see, e.g., Miller, 1956; Stewart, 
et al., 2005), one would still expect a (weak) positive correlation between people’s estimates and the 
actual number of objects in these conditions – assuming that participants are trying and not, in some 
way, hamstrung by the interface. 
Given that the same basic interface was used in all three experiments and this level of 
performance is not seen in later experiments, we concluded that this was unlikely to be the problem. 
Neither did it seem likely that boredom could be the only answer – as MOLE was clearly the most 
time-consuming of the four conditions examined here (while we did not actually time the conditions 
in this experiment, our observation was that MOLE took approximately 3-5 times as long to 
complete as the other conditions – an observation confirmed by a comparison between the times 
required to complete the MOLE and the Interleaved condition in Experiment 2 which, in effect, 
required participant to complete 40 tasks each equivalent to one Simple elicitation.) and the order of 
the conditions was randomized. This leaves task difficulty or motivation as the most likely 
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This is supported by the observation that, despite the poor performance of participants in the 
absolute estimation techniques, there are stable individual differences in performance. That is, the 
results in the three non-MOLE conditions are not just noise; rather, people with the smallest and 
largest errors in each of the four conditions tended to be the same, as shown in Table 2.  
This, combined with observations from the number estimation literature regarding the 
increasing inaccuracy of individual estimates of number as number increases, peoples’ tendency to 
underestimate higher numbers (Kaufman, Lord, Reese, & Volkmann, 1949) and their tendency to 
represent numbers on a logarithmic scale (Dehaene, Izard, Spelke, & Pica, 2008) leads to the 
conclusion that our set of possible numbers (100-300) represents a range where most people would 
have a great deal of difficulty making accurate estimates. Essentially, in subjective terms, this region 
of the number space is quite flat with an expanding cone of uncertainty as the numbers increase. 
Therefore, what slight, positive correlations one might expect are quite likely to be overwhelmed by 
the noise in the individual estimates. 
Given the difficulty of this task, it is also quite likely that some people lost motivation or 
changed strategies part way through, which would further depress any correlations. The interesting 
thing to note is that, regardless of what caused participants’ difficulties, the MOLE seems to largely 
prevent this response, enabling people who performed poorly in other conditions (consisting of 
simpler and less time-consuming tasks) to complete the task in a meaningful way.  
Discussion 
Our results show a clear benefit to the use of the MOLE technique in terms of both the 
calibration and the accuracy of elicited ranges. That is, the use of repeated, relative judgments in a 
manner that forces people to consider values across the range of possibilities resulted in estimated 
ranges that contained the true value far more often and best estimates that were more accurately 
located than any of the more typical elicitation techniques that we considered.  More-Or-Less Elicitation (MOLE)  18
Even given concerns regarding the performance of participants in the alternative elicitation 
techniques, we note that the degree of overconfidence observed in the MOLE condition is markedly 
lower than that commonly reported in other elicitation tasks (see, e.g., Morgan & Henrion, 1990) at 
only 7.1% compared to 30% or more (for standard 80% confidence intervals). 
Other Research Questions 
While previous work has found estimated ranges to be either narrowed (Russo & 
Schoemaker, 1992) or widened (Block & Harper, 1991) by initial best guesses with resultant 
increases or decreases in overconfidence, the present study, despite stronger control over question 
order, found no clear effect - although a weak trend was seen towards greater accuracy resulting 
from an initial best guess. As such, further work is required to tease out the intricacies of this 
variable effect.  
Similarly no strong evidence was found suggesting that indicating to people that previous 
participants had made estimates well outside their own range had any impact on subsequent revisions 
of those estimates. It could, however, be that participants realized that these “other participants” were 
computer generated. As such, additional research is needed to  determine what sort and how much 
counter-intuitive evidence people need to convince them to revise their opinions – or whether this 
only truly occurs with the presence of a known expert (Hawkins, et al., 2002) or when many such 
values are presented – as was the case in MOLE. 
Limitations  
There are some caveats regarding MOLE as used in Experiment 1. MOLE required 
participants to spend more time observing the stimulus and thus some of the effect may simply be 
noise reduction (although this would predict improvements in accuracy but not necessarily 
overconfidence). Finally, given the fact that the stimulus display (for all conditions) set out its circles 
in rows and columns the additional time could, potentially, have allowed participants more 
accurately to gauge or even count the circles, although no evidence of this was seen during testing. More-Or-Less Elicitation (MOLE)  19
Experiment 2 
Experiment 2 addressed the issue raised of how much the superior performance of the MOLE 
observed in Experiment 1 was due to its use of repetition, the combination of repetition and relative 
judgments, or the additional exposure to the stimuli. We do this by comparing the MOLE to other 
methods for obtaining repeated judgments from a single individual, based on either direct repetition 
of the task, or repetition with distractor tasks. 
Method 
Participants 
Forty-two participants were recruited in Adelaide; including graduate (12) and undergraduate 
students (18), university graduates (9) and a small number of non-university educated people (3). 
Seventeen participants were male and 25 female, with a mean age of 28.7 (SD = 8.9). Each received 
a $10 book voucher for their participation. 
Materials 
Three graphical user interfaces (GUIs) were designed along the same lines as those described 
above. For any given trial the GUI displayed a random array of between 100 and 300 circles but 
differed in terms of the responses available to participants. Figure 1 shows the revised MOLE GUI as 
it appeared during a trial, displaying a random array of circles and asking the participant to select 
which of two numbers they believe is closer to the true number of circles. Note that in all Experiment 
2 GUIs, jitter was added to the location of circles within the display so as to prevent the circles 
forming rows and columns – limiting participants’ ability to count or calculate the number of circles. 
The other two GUIs, Repeated and Interleaved, were both variants on the Simple method 
described in Experiment 1. The primary difference between these and the MOLE GUI was that, 
rather than selecting from presented alternatives, participants using these interfaces were asked to 
enter their estimates into editable text boxes. Specifically, participants were asked to give a minimum 
and a maximum estimate of the number of circles and then rate how confident they were that the true More-Or-Less Elicitation (MOLE)  20
value would fall in that range using a slider. 
Procedure 
A within-subjects design was used, with participants completing all three tasks in a single 
session in an order determined by a Latin Square. Participants were allowed a short break between 
each of the three conditions while the experimenter checked that the data had saved and started the 
next part of the experiment.  Only a single trial was conducted under each condition, with most 
participants completing the task in less than 40 minutes and none taking more than an hour. 
MOLE Procedure. The MOLE GUI worked as described for Experiment 1 with the exception 
that participants completed only a single trial.  
Repeated Procedure. The Repeated GUI also presented a single random array of 100-300 
circles that remained visible throughout the trial. Participants were asked to enter a minimum and 
maximum number representing the range that they thought the true number of circles would fall 
within. Participants were also asked to give a confidence rating for how likely it was that the true 
value would fall within this range. Although each participant saw only one array of circles in this 
condition, they were asked to give their minimum and maximum value 10 times. They were 
instructed that we were interested in seeing whether prolonged exposure to the stimulus led them to 
revise their estimates but that, if it did not, they were free to enter the same numbers on each trial. 
Interleaved Procedure. The Interleaved GUI differed from the others in that it presented a 
series of arrays rather than just one. Specifically, 40 arrays of between 100 and 300 circles were 
presented and the participant was asked to give a minimum and maximum number of circles (with 
confidence rating) for each. Ten of the 40 arrays, however, were repetitions of a single array, such 
that participants in this condition completed, essentially, the same task as during the Repeated 
condition but in a manner rendering them ‘blind’ to the repetition. These repeated arrays were 
distributed in a pseudo-random manner throughout 30 distractor trials in order to prevent participants 
seeing two identical arrays immediately adjacent or noticing any simple pattern (i.e., the 
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distractor trials, it was expected that some of the problems with using repeated judgments could be 
overcome. 
Results 
PDF Generation. Participants’ responses in each of the three conditions were used to 
construct probability density functions representing their beliefs regarding the number of circles 
present in the viewed stimuli. The process used to generate the PDFs from the MOLE data was 
exactly as described for Experiment 1. 
In the Repeated and Interleaved conditions, by comparison, a somewhat simpler (although 
related) method of PDF construction was used. Each participant estimated 10 ranges (Minimum to 
Maximum) for a given stimulus and each Min-Max range was used to define a triangular PDF to 
represent their beliefs regarding the number of circles displayed for each instance, with the mode set 
as the mid-point of the range.  The participant’s overall, or composite, PDF was then taken to be the 
average of the 10 triangular PDFs. 
Comparison of Elicitation Methods 
To compare elicitation methods we used essentially the same measures as in Experiment 1. 
For accuracy, correlations between the true and estimated number of circles were calculated, along 
with absolute percentage error. Calibration was examined by comparing the proportion of ranges that 
contained the true value (hits) and the confidence statements made by participants to yield a measure 
of overconfidence. The primary difference here is that, in Experiment 1, we were using mean values 
from 10 trials per participant per condition, whereas, in Experiment 2, each participant estimated 
only a single range and best guess per condition. 
Accuracy 
Figure 7 shows scatterplots of the true versus estimated number of circles for the three 
conditions. Figure 8, meanwhile, summarizes the main results from Experiment 2, showing the 
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percentage errors by experimental condition. Looking at both Figures, ones can see that the 
differences between MOLE and alternative elicitation methods are smaller here than in Experiment 
1. All three methods resulted in positive correlations between participants estimates and the true 
number of circles seen but MOLE’s performance was weaker here than in Experiment 1 (r = .44 
compared to .63) and an examination of the confidence intervals in Figure 7 suggests no advantage 
over the Repeated or Interleaved method in terms of the correlation. 
  Figure 8 also shows the participants’ mean absolute errors by condition (right-most plot). 
Inspection of this subplot shows that both the MOLE and Interleaved conditions result in smaller 
errors than the Repeated, 26.0 and 23.2% compared to 32.0%, a weak effect in each case, A = 0.56 
and 0.57. Any difference between the Interleaved and MOLE conditions is weaker still, A = 0.51. An 
examination of the mean differences between participants’ accuracy across the three conditions 
resulted in confidence intervals that all included zero, leading us to conclude that there is little 
support for the greater accuracy of any one elicitation method over the others. 
Overconfidence 
  In the overconfidence subplot in Figure 8 one can see a clear difference between the 
conditions. Specifically, both the MOLE, 16.7%, and the Interleaved, 11.9%, are seen to result in 
lower overconfidence than the Repeated method, 35.7%, both effects being weak to medium in 
strength, A = 0.60 and 0.62, respectively. The mean (see Figure 8 caption for explanation of why 
means rather than trimmed means are used here) level of overconfidence seen here for the MOLE is 
very similar to that observed in Experiment 1 (16.7% versus 15.3%). The Interleaved condition does 
slightly better again, resulting in 11.9% overconfidence. To further assess the strength of this effect 
in the absence of confidence intervals, binomial theorem was used to calculate the probability of 
achieving each level of calibration assuming that the rates from the alternative methods were true. 
For example, we calculated the probability of seeing 35.7% misses out of 42 observations (the 
number of participants), if the 16.7% miss rate observed in the MOLE was the underlying population 
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perfectly plausible, p = 0.85, as was the reverse, p = 0.77. Generating the Repeated results from 
either of these rates, however, is highly unlikely, p <.001 and p = .002 for the Interleaved and MOLE 
results respectively. We therefore conclude that the both the Interleaved and MOLE conditions 
provide an advantage over the Repeated in terms of calibration. 
  As noted earlier, calibration (and thus overconfidence) is a combination of two factors – the 
width of the estimated range and the accuracy of its placement. Looking at the first subplot in Figure 
9, one sees that the three conditions all produce markedly different range widths with MOLE 
producing the widest at 316, compared to the Repeated and Interleaved, at 159 and 233, respectively, 
with the effect being of medium strength, A = 0.68 and 0.61. That is, asking people to eliminate 
rather than construct a range seems to result in wider ranges. Examination of the second subplot of 
Figure 9 shows the confidence intervals constructed around the mean differences in range between 
the conditions and here we see confirmation that the MOLE produces wider ranges than the 
Repeated. The confidence interval for the mean difference between the MOLE and Interleaved, 
however, contains zero – although only just. 
An interesting paradox from these results is that MOLE, despite wider ranges and equal 
accuracy, resulted in only approximately equal (or worse) calibration than the Iterative technique. 
This result is explained, we think, by the nature of the MOLE procedure. If a person makes a mistake 
or changes their mind about their estimates, they can make statements that very quickly narrow the 
range down to almost zero. This was observed in a small number of instances (e.g., one where a final 
range of width 2 was seen and another where the final range observed did not include the value that 
the participant specifically stated as their estimate after testing) but these values are ignored by the 
trimmed mean and confidence intervals used to calculate the values in Figure 8. The overconfidence 
values in Figure 8, by comparison, include these ranges (as explained in the figure itself) and thus 
resulted in overconfidence due to the assumed 100% confidence level used in calculating calibration. 
By comparison, ‘errors’ in the other conditions are easily ‘overwritten’ by later responses and thus 
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The fact that participants in this Experiment only used the MOLE GUI once and thus had 
limited facility with it, combined with its inability to recover from entry errors, is therefore likely to 
have deflated the MOLE results compared to the first experiment where participants had the 
opportunity to grow familiar with the MOLE procedure over 10 trials. 
 Time. 
 Another important consideration for any elicitation technique is its ease of use. As noted 
above, the MOLE can be less forgiving of mistakes than the Repeated and Iterative methods and 
thus, in these terms, it could be argued that it is more difficult to use. Another measure of difficulty, 
however, is the time taken to complete the task. Figure 9 therefore shows the time taken to complete 
an elicitation task under each of the three conditions. Looking at this, it is clear that the MOLE is the 
fastest of the techniques, taking an average of less than 3 minutes to complete compared to around 
4½ for the Repeated and approximately 16 minutes for the Iterative - a strong to very strong effect of 
condition, A = 0.80 and 0.999, respectively. Of course, it is not surprising that the Interleaved 
condition required four times as long to complete as the Repeated as it also required four times as 
many judgments to be made.  
Discussion 
  A number of differences between the results in Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 need to be 
explained. The first is the improved performance of the non-MOLE methods. Even the worst of the 
Experiment 2 conditions (Repeated), resulted in greater accuracy and less overconfidence than any of 
the non-MOLE conditions from Experiment 1. 
  This is not unexpected, given that people were required to look at the stimuli in this task for 
significantly longer than in any of the one-trial elicitation techniques. A second consideration is the 
difference in sample, with the Experiment 2 sample being significantly older and more highly 
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differences in intelligence would account for the difference in performance, it seems that differences 
in conscientiousness and motivation could be contributing factor. 
  A second query relates to the slightly worse performance of MOLE in this, second, 
experiment. While the differences between the results from the first and second experiments are not 
large, given the observations about the older sample made above, one might have expected an 
increase in the accuracy and calibration of participants in the MOLE condition too – rather than them 
being about the same or slightly worse.  
  A possible explanation for this relates to a practice effect. In the first experiment, participants 
used the MOLE GUI for 10 separate trials and would thus, therefore, have been growing increasingly 
familiar with its functioning and, as a result, their facility with the program could prevent errors of 
the sorts described above. By comparison, in the second experiment, participants used the MOLE 
GUI for only one trial. Some support for this was found in a division of Experiment 1 MOLE trials 
into early and late. This indicated that participants’ accuracy increased in later trials – with an 
average correlation of 0.70 in the last 5 trials compared to 0.60 in the first five.  
Overall, though, the results of Experiment 2 support the use of repeated judgments in 
elicitation tasks. The Repeated method, while subject to all of the standard problems with repeated 
individual judgments, still improved both the accuracy and calibration of elicited ranges compared to 
Experiment 1. That said, the degree of overconfidence observed in the Repeated condition, ~35%, is 
not any better than is commonly observed in elicitation tasks using standard methods. 
By contrast, there is evidence that the Interleaved method, which avoided these problems by 
locating the experimental trials within a series of distractor tasks and thereby creating a series of 
‘blind’ judgments like those described by Stroop (1932), yields a clear benefit. Specifically, there 
was an increase in the accuracy of estimates but also a significant increase in the width of elicited 
ranges and a commensurate decrease in overconfidence. That is, by having people make a series of 
independent estimates about the same stimulus figure and combining these, both accuracy and 
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Finally, MOLE achieved results approximately equivalent to the Interleaved in terms of both 
the accuracy of estimates and the degree of overconfidence observed in estimated ranges in a fraction 
of the time. In general, then, it seems that MOLE successfully produces the same benefits as a more 
complex, repeated judgment method (Interleaved) without the need for distractor tasks. In fact, given 
the types of questions for which answers commonly need to be elicited, it is difficult to conceive of 
how an approach like the Interleaved might work outside the laboratory. While arrays of dots are 
non-distinctive enough for the same one to be repeatedly presented to an individual (if appropriately 
distracted), questions about events, objects or values (the population of France, for example) will be 
specific enough that people are far more likely to recall being asked that question already and be able 
to recall their answer, leading to the diminishing returns for additional judgments observed in 
previous research (see, e.g., Ariely, et al., 2000; Herzog & Hertwig, 2009; Rauhut & Lorenz, in 
press; Vul & Pashler, 2008) . Thus, the Interleaved method, while useful as a standard of 
comparison, seems unlikely to prove useful in applied settings. 
As a result of this, combined with the fact that MOLE takes less than one-fifth of the time 
required to complete the Interleaved, we believe it is superior as a potential elicitation method. This 
observation also helps to counter the suggestion raised following Experiment 1: that the advantage of 
MOLE over the traditional range elicitation techniques might have resulted solely from noise 
reduction due to participants spending longer looking at the stimulus. Rather, MOLE equals or 
outperforms tasks that required participants to view the stimulus figure for significantly longer. 
Experiment 3 
Experiment 3 addressed the generalizability of the results from experiments 1 and 2 to other 
stimuli. Perceptual stimuli were originally chosen to allow production of a task on which individual 
differences in participant knowledge would be irrelevant and which would allow use of repeated 
measures in a way that traditional elicitation questions would not. However, given that the majority 
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from memory in order to answer a question) our use of a perceptual stimulus might mean that our 
results are limited to a narrow range of elicitation problems. Thus, we need to confirm MOLE’s 
benefit over alternative elicitation methods when used to elicit answers to questions where 
participants are relying on knowledge rather than perception. 
Method 
Participants 
Participants were 60 university students and members of the general public, 27 male and 33 
female with a mean age of 25.3, (SD = 8.9), all recruited in Adelaide. Each received a $20 book 
voucher for their participation. In addition, to encourage accuracy, an additional $20 voucher was 
promised to the best performing participant from each condition. 
Materials and Procedure 
Participants were sorted randomly into one of three conditions, for which separate Matlab 
GUIs were written. Each GUI presented, in a random order, the same 15 general-knowledge 
questions with numerical answers ranging from 14.5 (percentage of the world’s population living in 
Africa) to more than 1.7 million (area of the Australian State of Queensland in km
2). Five of these 
questions had answers that were percentages and, thus, had clear preset ranges (0-100) for 
participants’ responses. The remaining 10 questions were divided into two groups – designated 
double and quintuple range according to whether the MOLE GUI used a range from zero to double 
the true value or zero to five times the true value as its preset range. Each of these two groups had 
questions from across the full range of magnitude and were regarded by the authors as being of 
similar difficulty.  
The MOLE GUI was essentially identical to that described for Experiments 1 and 2, except 
that, instead of an array of circles, participants saw a single question presented. This question 
remained visible while the GUI presented pairs of possible values and asked participants to indicate 
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choices and confidence rating were then used as described in the previous experiments to iteratively 
hone in on the range the participant thought feasible and to calculate the value they felt was most 
likely. The only difference from the previously described method was the inclusion of a final, 
evaluation step where people were presented with the range calculated by MOLE and asked to 
evaluate how confident they were that the true value would fall within this range – enabling 
participants to indicate, for example, those instances when they had made an error and did not 
believe that the range generated from their responses would contain the true value. 
The second condition was equivalent to the ‘triangular’ elicitation method from Experiment 1 
(excepting only that the range was elicited prior to the best guess). This procedure was used as it 
gave a range estimate that should be unaffected by the best guess but also yielded a direct measure of 
the value the participant thought most likely. As in the MOLE condition, the question remained 
visible while all of these estimates were made. 
The final condition (labeled “consider the opposite”) is similar to the ‘iterative’ condition 
from Experiment 1 but draws upon Herzog and Herwig’s (2009) observations regarding the use of 
dialectical processes in improving point estimates. For uncertainty elicitation, however, the key 
improvement needs to be in the range rather than the best guess and, as such, the dialectical process 
was used to revise the range. Specifically, after a participant made a set of estimates exactly as they 
would in the ‘triangular’ condition, they were asked to: 1, consider the possibility that their range did 
not contain the true value; 2, indicate whether the true value was more likely to lie above or below 
their range; and, 3, revise their minimum and maximum following this thought experiment. As such, 
the process has much in common with the ‘consider the opposite’ debiasing strategy proposed by 
Lord, Lepper and Preston (1984) and used by Mussweiler, Strack and Pfeiffer (2000) to limit the 
impact of anchoring on estimates. 
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Results 
Comparisons between elicitation methods 
To confirm whether MOLE maintained its advantage over more standard elicitation methods, 
despite the change from perceptual to epistemic uncertainty, participants’ overconfidence (how often 
their ranges did not contain the true value) and accuracy were calculated. Given that the correct 
answers to the questions used in Experiment 3 varied by multiple orders of magnitude from one 
another, the absolute percentage error measures used in Experiments 1 and 2 could not meaningfully 
be used here. Instead, as the accuracy measure, Order of Magnitude Error (OME, i.e., log10[|true-
estimate|/true]) was used (Brown & Siegler, 1993) as this penalizes errors of the same order of 
magnitude, above or below the true value, equally. 
Overconfidence 
  While participants in this Experiment were assigned to a single elicitation condition, each 
saw five questions of each type. As a result, overconfidence was calculated in the same manner as 
for Experiment 1, with a percentage calibration score out of five calculated (the number of ranges 
that contained the true value) and compared to the mean confidence across the five questions of each 
type. Figure 10 shows the mean overconfidence for the three different elicitation conditions and each 
of the three question types. 
Looking at the left subplot of Figure 10, one sees that the degree of overconfidence in the 
‘percentage’ questions is actually very similar across the three elicitation techniques – all averaging 
around 20%. On the other question types, however, examination of the confidence intervals suggests 
differences between the conditions as the Triangular and Consider the Opposite CIs do not contain 
the MOLE means. Specifically, on the ‘double’ questions MOLE has an advantage over both the 
other elicitation methods, with almost no overconfidence (1.8%) being displayed, compared to more 
than 20% for the Triangular and more than 30% for the Consider the Opposite. Similarly, on the 
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Consider the Opposite yielded 38.9 and 30.4%. More generally, it is interesting to note that all of the 
MOLE confidence intervals contain zero as a possible value – that is, it can be regarded as plausible 
that the MOLE procedure produces well-calibrated ranges whereas this is not true for either of the 
other conditions. The effect of condition here is of moderate strength, A = 0.64 and 0.66, when 
comparing MOLE to Triangular and Consider the Opposite, respectively. 
  The fact that MOLE does not seem to offer an advantage in the percentage questions, 
however, needs further examination. As a result, we looked at not just the overconfidence score but 
also the actual levels of confidence observed in each condition. These are shown in the right subplot 
of Figure 10. A brief examination of these confidence intervals confirms that MOLE produces 
markedly greater confidence in ranges than the alternative methods, averaging around 85% across 
the three question types, compared to around 65% for the other two conditions. This is a strong 
effect, A = 0.78 and 0.76 when comparing MOLE with the Triangular and Consider the Opposite 
conditions, respectively. 
  This is important as, while overconfidence is an important aspect of calibration, it is not the 
only one that we need to consider. We also need to consider the informativeness of estimates and, in 
this case, the actual confidence is important. For example, consider two people who are both 20% 
overconfident in their range estimation. One of these, however, is 100% confident in their ranges and 
thus 80% of their ranges contain the true value. The other, by comparison, has only 20% confidence 
in their ranges and, therefore, none of their ranges contain the true value. Given the choice between 
these people, we would clearly prefer the more confident person as their ranges are more 
informative. Thus, MOLE results are actually superior across all three question types, despite their 
having a clear advantage in terms of overconfidence on only two question types. 
Accuracy 
Figure 11 shows the OME observed under each elicitation method and on each question type. 
As noted above, the OME is a log measure, so -1 indicates an estimate that was only one-tenth as 
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Looking at Figure 11, one sees that MOLE tends to produce far less variable errors – not just 
in terms of limiting the magnitude of large errors (as a preset range necessarily will) but also in terms 
of limiting the low errors observed in the other conditions. This is of particular interest as an 
examination of the results in the top two rows of Figure 11 suggests that underestimation is the larger 
problem – with the mean OMEs in the Triangular and Consider the Opposite conditions all being 
negative. Across all three question types, MOLE yields the OME closest to zero and the confidence 
intervals around these values contain neither the Triangular nor the Consider the Opposite means for 
any of three question types. This effect of condition is strong, A = 0.74 and 0.75 when comparing 
MOLE to the Triangular and Consider the Opposite conditions, respectively. 
  The results are also qualitatively different across the three elicitation conditions. As noted 
above, MOLE errors are far less variable but, in addition, on the quintuple questions, MOLE tends to 
produce overestimates rather than the underestimates seen in the other conditions. This probably 
reflects an anchoring effect produced by the high values produced by the MOLE’s random selection 
from the wide initial range, combined with the high degree of uncertainty in the participant’s 
estimates. That is, because participants did not have a good idea of what the true value was, high 
initial numbers anchored people’s responses. However, the errors here were still less than those 
observed in the other conditions. 
Effect of preset ranges on elicited ranges and values 
A possible objection to the previous experiments’ conclusions was that the use of preset 
ranges might be the primary cause of MOLE’s advantage. Three different types of questions were 
used in this experiment to test this question; specifically, with preset ranges of 0-100 (Percentage), 0-
2x the true value (Double) and 0-5x the true value (Quintuple). As can be seen in Figure 10, the 
effect of question is noticeable, with confidence tending to being lower and overconfidence higher 
on the quintuple questions in particular. These effects are weak, however, A = 0.57 and 0.58 
comparing the Quintuple questions with the Percentage and Double questions, respectively for 
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The primary question here, however, is whether, if MOLE’s advantage lies in its use of preset 
ranges, manipulating these ranges affect it disproportionately. Specifically, one might expect no 
advantage for MOLE in the percentage questions (as participants in all conditions have the same 
preset range) and a stronger advantage in the double questions than the quintuple questions (as the 
former restrict high estimates to a greater extent and has a mean - of the initial distribution of 
possible options - equal to the true value). 
As noted above, however, MOLE had at least some advantage in all conditions – although it 
was weakest in the percentage questions. The idea that the preset range is the primary cause of 
MOLE’s advantage, however, is argued against by the fact that its advantage in terms of calibration 
and accuracy is greater in the quintuple questions than in the double.  
Discussion 
In general, the results of experiment 3 confirm the benefits of MOLE, despite the change 
from perceptual to epistemic uncertainty and from a within- to a between-subjects design. 
Specifically, MOLE resulted in lower overconfidence compared to the alternative measures. By 
contrast, the Consider the Opposite method failed to show any significant benefit over the Triangular 
elicitation with both producing very similar results (as seen in Figures 10 and 11).  
The accuracy of point estimates calculated using MOLE was also superior to the direct 
estimates made by participants in the alternative elicitation methods - reducing the number of wildly 
wrong estimates – although it should be noted that participants found the questions hard and their 
answers in all conditions often differed significantly from the truth.  
Finally, the attempts to identify any role of the preset range in the advantage MOLE enjoys 
were inconclusive. As noted above, MOLE had no advantage in terms of overconfidence on the 
Percentage-type questions (as confidence and calibration scores were both around 20% higher than 
in the other conditions, which is in line with a hypothesis holding that the preset range is responsible 
for MOLE’s advantage). If this were the entire story, however, one would also expect the Double–
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that MOLE also results in far fewer extremely low estimates also argues against the preset range 
being the sole cause of it superiority – particularly as regards accuracy. That is, MOLE’s preset rage 
allows for just as inaccurate low values as the other methods but these are not observed. It should 
also be noted that, given the same degree of overconfidence, we should prefer the estimates of people 
with higher confidence and calibration scores and, taking this into account MOLE can, justifiably, be 
argued to be superior to either alternative across all three question types. 
General Discussion 
Relative Elicitation 
It seems reasonable to conclude that elicitation techniques enabling people to use the well-
honed, relative judgment capacity already at their disposal can be powerful tools for reducing bias. 
The degree of overconfidence observed in MOLE responses across our experiments was much 
smaller than in the traditional range elicitation conditions, for which overconfidence averaging 30% 
or more was observed in all experiments and alternative methods examined (excluding the 
Interleaved), corresponding to the standard observation from the field that people’s 80% confidences 
ranges contain the true value less than 50% of the time (Morgan & Henrion, 1990). Only the use of a 
repeated judgment elicitation method using distractor tasks to enable multiple assessments of a single 
stimulus provided similar results to MOLE in terms of overconfidence reduction, at a significant cost 
in time and extensibility to non-laboratory settings. 
Of equal interest is the fact that MOLE seems to work not just by causing people to consider 
more values, thereby including a wider range of possibilities (i.e., increasing subjective accuracy by 
helping people realize the limits of their knowledge) but also by improving their objective accuracy, 
at least for some problem types. That is, while participants using traditional methods proved poor at 
estimating the true number of objects displayed in the stimuli used in Experiments 1 and 2, 
repeatedly judging which option was closer to the true value resulted in participants in the MOLE 
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accuracy of estimates made in response to general knowledge questions was markedly improved. 
This is important as people use two competing objectives when providing judgments – accuracy and 
informativeness (Yaniv & Foster, 1995) – and simply forcing people to give a wider range is not, by 
itself, necessarily an improvement. 
The fact that MOLE results in greater accuracy and confidence as well as calibration, 
however, suggests that it offers a way around this trade-off, enabling people to give ranges (and point 
estimates) that maintain an appropriate degree of uncertainty while still feeling that they are 
providing useful information. This seems a plausible explanation for why, despite the difficulty of 
the task in Experiment 1, people in the MOLE condition were able to produce useful estimates when 
people undertaking what seem to be easier tasks (e.g., Simple elicitation) struggled. 
Repeated vs Single Judgments 
Clearly, MOLE forces people to consider options they otherwise may not, resulting in 
multiple searches of their beliefs about the stimulus. While it seems reasonable that this should 
increase the range of possibilities considered and thus improve calibration, more interesting is the 
fact that it also increases accuracy. That is, MOLE’s use of relative judgments seems to be ‘blind’ in 
the manner described by Stroop (1932) and, as such, enables repeated judgments to be collected from 
a single individual in a manner that avoids the pitfalls described by previous research (see, e.g., 
Ariely, et al., 2000; Rauhut & Lorenz, in press; Vul & Pashler, 2008). 
The use of relative, rather than absolute, judgments in MOLE also allows people to use more 
finely tuned cognitive abilities, taking advantage of the fact that people tend to be better at making 
relative rather than absolute judgments. This supports the idea from the bounded rationality 
(Gigerenzer & Selten, 2001) literature that enabling people to answer questions in formats they are 
adept with is a good way to avoid bias, and accords with observations, from the psychophysics 
literature on magnitude estimation tasks, regarding the inaccuracy of absolute judgments (see, e.g., 
Stevens, 1957). More-Or-Less Elicitation (MOLE)  35
Another interesting observation arising from the results presented here relates to the 
differences in judgments between Experiments 1 and 2. In Experiment 1, range estimates based on 
single judgments are very inaccurate, showing basically no correlation with the true value. In 
Experiment 2, by comparison, the mean correlations between the true value and the estimates are 
around 0.4. This difference, obviously, needs to be accounted for. One possibility is that this is the 
result of noise reduction due to the increased time participants spend looking at each of the arrays in 
the second experiment, although the fact that the effect exists in the Interleaved condition as well as 
the Repeated undermines this explanation. An alternate explanation lies in the difference between the 
two experiments in terms of the sample and procedure. 
Specifically, the sample used for Experiment 2 was older and included many more graduates 
and postgraduate students. As such, it is possible that this group were more intelligent and or more 
motivated than the undergraduate sample used in Experiment 1. The repetitive nature of Experiment 
1, with 40 estimation tasks compared to just 3 in Experiment 2 may also have led to participants 
paying less attention to each individual task in the earlier experiment. Regardless of which 
explanation is preferred, however, the most interesting observation is that MOLE produced 
consistently good across the three experiments. 
Limitations 
A key limitation of MOLE is its need for bounds, which limits its usefulness to situations 
where reasonable limits can be put on what people might believe (although these initial limits could 
be set quite broad without greatly increasing the number of steps required to complete the task due to 
MOLE’s iterative narrowing of the range to exclude infeasible values). There remains, however, a 
risk of limiting the outcomes a person is allowed to choose. That said, this should not be a problem 
in many applied domains where expert knowledge is being sought. In these situations there are, 
often, known limits on outcomes similar to those modeled by our use of percentage-type questions.  
Also to be considered is that fact that, while the results of Experiment 3 demonstrate that the use of a 
preset range cannot, alone, account for MOLE’s superiority, it may contribute to it on the More-Or-Less Elicitation (MOLE)  36
percentage-type questions, at least, and this needs to be taken into account when contemplating its 
use. 
The time requirements for application of MOLE also need to be considered. The procedure 
takes between 1 and 3 minutes per elicitation task, compared to a fraction of that for the traditional 
range elicitations used in Experiment 1. The improved accuracy and calibration, however, should 
more than outweigh this in most situations where expert opinion is being elicited as it is most 
commonly the case that only a single value needs to be elicited from a given expert on a given 
occasion. Certainly, when compared to the only other method producing comparable benefits 
(Interleaved), the MOLE’s time requirements are quite modest. 
Future Directions 
Given our findings, it seems worthwhile to continue looking at relative and repeated 
judgments as methods for avoiding bias in elicited responses. An obvious direction is to refine the 
MOLE procedure such that it can automatically determine if a person has reached the limits of their 
certainty, rather than requiring a set number of questions. The application of this approach to other 
biases that impact on elicited responses such as anchoring would also be of interest - given how 
resistant to debiasing anchoring has proved (Wilson, Houston, Etling, & Brekke, 1996). 
Finally, while we believe the focus on relative judgments is an important advance in 
developing elicitation methods, it should be possible to improve the way in which subjective PDFs 
are generated. One interesting possibility is to follow the lead of Sanborn and Griffiths (2008), who 
apply modern computational Bayesian sampling algorithms, based on Markov-Chain Monte Carlo 
methods, as experimental procedures for understanding the subjective probability distributions 
people use to represent mental categories. Applying the same principled ideas to the problem of 
value elicitation is a promising direction for future research. 
MOLE also needs to be adapted for specific, applied problems in industries where the 
accurate capture of uncertainty is essential. As an example, consider the oil and gas industry, where 
models (the inputs of which are elicited 80% confidence intervals around geological parameters such More-Or-Less Elicitation (MOLE)  37
as rock porosity and permeability) inform multi-billion dollar investment decisions and 
overconfidence has been shown to significantly erode value. For example, 30% overconfidence in 
input parameters resulted in a $250M loss of value in one model of a large off-shore development 
(Welsh, Begg, & Bratvold, 2007b).  
Conclusion 
In all, the results reconfirm the problems (i.e., overconfidence and the inaccuracy of absolute 
judgments) with standard range-elicitation methods and support the use of repeated individual 
judgments in elicitation tasks where the problems with this process can be overcome – either through 
the use of time delays between judgments or other means such as distractor tasks. Where these are 
not possible, however, MOLE seems to yield the benefits of repeated measures without these 
problems. Its technique of asking for repeated, relative judgments across the range of possible 
estimates avoids the problems of simple repetition without the need for lengthy delays or complex 
experimental design and provides estimates equal or superior to the repeated judgment methods 
explored herein and greatly superior to traditional range estimates. 
Methods like MOLE thus seem a worthwhile addition to the arsenal of researchers interested 
in reducing bias in elicited responses. While further refinements are possible, the basic process, of 
using repeated, relative judgments, is strongly supported by the findings herein. The current method 
is simple and easily transferable to new domains (as demonstrated by its use in perceptual and 
traditional uncertainty tasks in our experiments) and, given the need for accurate elicitation methods 
in both cognitive psychology research and a wide variety of applied domains, MOLE and its future 
refinements seem capable of contributing to better outcomes in medical, industrial, financial and 
environmental decision making.  More-Or-Less Elicitation (MOLE)  38
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Footnotes 
1 Given previous research indicating that people are better at evaluating than generating confidence 
intervals, in all of the traditional range elicitation methods, people were, rather than being asked to 
generate confidence intervals of particular types (e.g., 90% confidence intervals), instead asked to 
give a minimum and maximum value and then indicate how confident they were that the true value 
would fall within that range. That is, allowance was made, e.g., for the fact that people would not 
regard their “minimum” as the true minimum. More-Or-Less Elicitation (MOLE)  45
Table 1. Example data from MOLE task including participants responses and actions taken in 
response. 
Stage   Options  Choice  Confidence  Action 
1  2  22  22  100  Range minimum set to 12 
2  173  220  220  100  Range minimum set to 196 
3 243  398  398  86  Construct  triangular  PDF 
4 382  399  382  62  Construct  triangular  PDF 
5 200  363  363  84  Construct  triangular  PDF 
6 197  300  300  77  Construct  triangular  PDF 
7 275  347  347  87  Construct  triangular  PDF 
8 385  391  385  54  Construct  triangular  PDF 
9  211  276  276  98  Construct  triangular PDF 
10 198  235  235  93  Construct  triangular  PDF 
Post   Average triangular PDFs and calculate final mode/best estimate 
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Table 2. Spearman correlations between participants’ mean absolute percentage errors from all four 
conditions. 
 Simple  Triangular  Iterative  MOLE 
Simple 1  -  -  - 
Triangular 0.48  1  -  - 
Iterative  0.35 0.39 1  - 
MOLE  0.21 0.18 0.14 1 
Note: N = 40 in all cases.  
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Figure Captions 
Figure 1. MOLE Graphical User Interface (GUI). NB – this GUI is taken from Experiment 2. The 
Experiment 1 GUI was identical except that the circles were aligned in rows and columns without the 
‘jiggle’ added in Experiment 2 and seen here. 
Figure 2. Depiction of MOLE PDF construction process using data from Table 1. Subplot a) shows 
the construction of a triangular PDF for the data given in the “Stage 3” row of Table 1. the 
participant chose 398 as more likely than 243 with 86% confidence; therefore the mode of the PDF is 
set 86% of the way between these options (i.e., closer to 398) while the minimum and maximum 
values are set at either end of that part of the original range that the participant did not explicitly rule 
out (i.e., 196-400). Subplot b) shows all of the PDFs constructed in this way – one for each of Stages 
3 to 10 in this example. Finally, subplot c) shows the final, averaged PDF representing a participant’s 
beliefs across the range of all possible numbers 0-400 and the mode taken from this PDF. 
Figure 3. Histograms of degree of overconfidence observed in Experiment 1, by experimental 
condition, with mean (triangles) and 20% trimmed means (circles) shown. The confidence intervals 
around the trimmed means are 95%. 
Figure 4. Mean differences between individual participants’ results across all unique combinations 
of conditions in Experiment 1 (M = MOLE, S = Simple, T = Triangular and I = Iterative). Circles 
show 20% trimmed means, with 98.7% CIs around these to maintain an alpha level of .05 overall, 
while triangles show the untrimmed means for comparison. The top subplot shows mean differences 
between participants’ overconfidence levels, the central subplot between correlation strengths and 
the last between absolute percentage errors. 
Figure 5. Histograms showing distributions of correlations between participant data and true number 
of circles in Experiment 1stimulus figures, by experimental condition, with mean (triangles) and 
20% trimmed means (circles) shown. The confidence intervals around the trimmed means are 95%. 
Figure 6. Histograms showing distributions of participants’ mean absolute percentage errors in 
Experiment 1, by experimental condition, with mean (triangles) and 20% trimmed means (circles) More-Or-Less Elicitation (MOLE)  48
shown. The confidence intervals around the trimmed means are 95%. NB - values above 100% are 
all displayed as 110. 
Figure 7. Scatterplots showing true number of circles versus participants’ estimates for each 
condition in Experiment 2. The rank order correlations between the true and estimated values are 
given in the subplot title. Note: The red stars indicate the x-axis locations of outliers; three were 
observed in the Repeated condition and one in the Interleaved – all corresponding to estimates of 
more than twice the maximum number of circles displayed (i.e. >600). 
Figure 8. Summary of main Experiment 2 results, showing: in subplot a) correlations between the 
true number of objects and participants’ estimates in each condition (Repeated, Interleaved and 
MOLE); in subplot b) the degree of overconfidence observed across the sample under each 
condition; and, in subplot c) the mean absolute error observed in each condition. All error bars depict 
98.3% confidence intervals to maintain the family-wise alpha of .05. The circles in subplot ‘c’ show 
20% trimmed means while the triangles show the mean. Subplot ‘b’ shows only the untrimmed 
means as the binary nature of calibration (with a given range either containing the true value or not) 
makes the use of a trimmed means and confidence intervals problematic. 
Figure 9. Estimated range widths and completion times for Experiment 2 conditions. The leftmost 
subplot shows the raw ranges, while the central one shows the mean difference in ranges between 
conditions for analyses. The rightmost subplot shows the time taken to complete the task. All 
subplots display both the means (triangles) and 20% trimmed means (circles) of each group. The 
confidence intervals around the trimmed means are 98.3% to maintain the family-wise alpha level of 
.05. Note  - the ‘x’ in subplot (b) indicates the average time taken by participants to complete just the 
10 experimental trials of the Iterative condition. 
Figure 10. Mean overconfidence and confidence observed, by experimental condition and question 
type in Experiment 3. The small points show the means, while the larger markers (triangles, 
diamonds and stars) show 20% trimmed means. The confidence intervals around the trimmed means 
are 98.3, to maintain a family-wise alpha level of .05 within each set of three confidence intervals. More-Or-Less Elicitation (MOLE)  49
Figure 11. Histograms of order of magnitude errors (OMEs) in Experiment 3 by elicitation condition 
(row) and question type (column). OME is plotted on the x-axis of all subplots. The 20% trimmed 
mean is shown on each subplot (circle) while the confidence intervals around these means are set at 
98.3% to maintain a .05 alpha level for each comparison. More-Or-Less Elicitation (MOLE)  50
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